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A. Einstein was in fact a migrant. Born in Germany, he lived in Monaco and later in Italy with his 
family that left Germany due to economic difficulties. He was educated and worked in Switzerland, 
obtaining the Swiss citizenship. After a short stay in the UK, Einstein became an US citizen. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of social security benefits that jobseekers, nationals 
of other Member State, residing in another Member States are in title to, as well as the economic 
implications of free movement of persons and labour market access. Consequently, it aims to 
disentangle between labour mobility welfare effects and “benefit tourism” looking in particular at 
the United Kingdom social security system and analysing the policy framework currently in place that 
governs the free movement of people across the European Union Member States. 
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I.  Introduction  
The European Union is one of the main destinations for people seeking a better livelihood. Contrary 
to recent mass-media debates and despite increasing global migration flows, intra-EU migration is 
low. Annual cross border mobility within the EU accounts in fact only for 0.35% of total EU 
population (OECD Economic Survey of the European Union, 2012). As a reference point, annual 
mobility across states in the United States is 2.4% of the total population. Less than 3% EU citizens 
reside in a different EU country, which is one tenth than the United States (Barslund, Busse and 
Schwarzwalder, 2015). Not only is labour mobility in the European Union low, but it may be 
decreasing in the future if one accounts for the expected future income convergence between 
Eastern and Western EU countries.  
Nevertheless, immigration from Eastern Europe has attracted much attention from media and 
governments, with the accession to the EU of ten countries in 2004 followed by two more, Romania 
and Bulgaria (EU2) in 2007 and removal of labour market restrictions in 2014. The EU-15 are 
presumed to be the countries most preferred by the migrant citizens of the more recent Member 
States. Several concerns were raised about the economic effects of foreign workers on host country 
economies, such as whether immigrants have a negative effect on the welfare of native population, 
depressing wages and increasing unemployment. Certainly, the economic effects of immigration 
depend on the host country economy and labour market capacity of absorption, substitutability as 
well as complementarity of native and foreign workers, but moreover on the skills  of migrating 
population as well as the size of immigration flows.  
Recent debates especially in the United Kingdom have focused on “benefit tourism” i.e. foreign 
citizens using their right to move freely in the EU with the intention of exploiting more generous 
social security systems. In November 2014, the British Prime Minister gave a speech advocating for 
EU treaty reforms that would restrict EU workers access to in-work as well as child benefits and 
impose tighter restrictions on new Member States and EU jobseekers and would ban those abusing 
free movement right. 
This paper addresses several questions: What are the main driving factors of migration? What are 
the economic implications and the welfare effects of influx of foreign workers?  What are the EU 
rules on free movement of persons and social security rights of mobile citizens? Furthermore, it 
assesses from an economic perspective the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ) in the case Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig. In this case the Social Court of Leipzig asked the 
Court of Justice to interpret EU law that regulates the free movement of persons and social security 
coordination. The Court ruled that the host Member State (i.e. Germany), may deny “social security 
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benefits for jobseekers who are in need of assistance” coming from a different Member State (i.e. 
Romania) in the absence of a genuine link with the host Member State if the concerned citizen 
immigrated only to seek employment or benefit from social assistance. Furthermore, this paper 
takes into consideration the Court reasoning and applies it to the “benefit tourism” debate 
concerning Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the United Kingdom. It analyses the British social 
security system, employment rate as well as social assistance requests from Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals. 
The main findings of the paper highlight that labour mobility affects welfare, both receiving and 
sending countries being better off in terms of employment and wage levels. Certainly high-skilled 
migrants are more beneficial for the host country economy than lower-skilled or inactive mobile 
citizens. Nevertheless, empirical studies show that low-skilled mobile workers positively influence 
the host country labour market by inducing the native labour force to further specialize. Concerning 
the UK, the main reason of EU2  citizens to emigrate is work related and only a small percentage 
actually request social assistance. Therefore the benefit tourism debate is grossly exaggerated.  
 
However immigration policy is a complex issue. Leaving aside cultural differences, from an economic 
point of view, it may be the case that on the short-run tax contributions offset out payments of 
social benefits, but further analysis is needed in order to understand the long-run implications and if 
these effects cancel each other out. Nevertheless, restrictive immigration policy may also have a 
negative effect on the home country welfare, reducing the number of high skilled workers from 
abroad. This is because mobile workers may choose to migrate to countries with lower labour 
market restrictions. Given that much of the UK debate concerns inactive persons or low-skilled 
labour force, the UK risks to induce in fact a crowding-out effect: because of the negative image of 
immigration only low-skill immigrants without any other opportunities may decide to go to the UK, 
crowding out high-skilled labour force. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II analyses the welfare effects of free movement of 
persons, while Section III discusses the economics of labour movement. Section IV presents the EU 
rules on the free movement of persons and Section V the EU rules on social security rights. Section 
VI presents the Dano case and Section VII examines the situation of social benefits in the United 
Kingdom. Finally, Section VIII provides the conclusions of the analysis. 
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II.  Welfare Effects of Free Movement of Persons  
Public perception concerning immigration is exaggerated. Certainly, cultural differences  may play a 
major role, as aversion or fear of foreigners may create expectations.  But focusing on economic 
aspects, further analysis needs to be conducted in order to disentangle the various welfare effects of 
free movement of persons, distinguishing between economically active and inactive persons and 
investigating the trade-offs between the two. There are different drivers as well as impacts of intra-
EU mobility. Several factors may determine the decision to migrate.  
Let M = f(WH,F, E, L, D, S) be the function that defines the decision to migrate:                                
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic factors: 
Let: H-host country, F-foreign country  
WH,F = difference in wages between country H and F 
E = economic conditions (e.g. welfare system in the country of destination, business cycle) 
L= individual labour market status, i.e. economically active/inactive 
Other factors: 
D= demographic factors (e.g. number of family members, education, age) 
S= socio-cultural factors (e.g. language, proximity, religion, culture) 
 
The economic literature on intra-EU mobility finds as the most significant factors to migrate wage 
differentials, economic conditions and overall gains from migrating. Essentially, individuals compare 
socio-economic benefits with costs of relocating, which may be denoted by C=f(P, T, O, I), where:                                              
P= psychological cost from leaving the country 
T= transition cost, transport and housing 
O=opportunity cost from future wage and career development in the home country 
I= immigration policy, i.e. time and procedures needed to apply for residence, time needed to apply 
for citizenship or right to vote, etc.; the more restrictive the immigration policy, the higher the cost 
of migrating and therefore the lower the incentive to migrate. 
  
Migration is higher when expectations of higher labour returns, income and employment 
perspectives are higher. Ultimately, if benefits from migrating are larger than the costs, migration 
will occur. 
 
Cyclical changes of economic growth also impacts migration trends.  The economic and financial 
crisis has had a strong impact on patterns of intra-EU migration flow. The migration patterns initially 
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from East to West, have shifted from South to North (EC, 2013) as shown in Figure 1. In terms of 
volume, migration from East to West remains higher, however significant migration flows were 
registered from Southern countries deeply affected by the crisis such as Italy, Spain and Greece, to 
countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom.  
Figure 1. Migration Flow 
 
                            Source: EPC Issue Paper, 2013 
 
Immigration policy is a difficult topic, as labour mobility affects economic welfare in the host 
country. Since country H welfare depends on the labour market status (i.e. economically 
active/inactive) and quality (i.e. high-skilled/low-skilled) of migrants as well as of native workers, 
different labour market status of foreign workers as well as skills, may impact differently on the host 
country economy.  
 
Formally: 
Let WH=f(LH,F
h,l , IH,F
h,l ,), where: 
LH
h,l,  number of native labour force that may be high-skilled, h, or low-skilled, l 
LF
h,l,  number of foreign labour force in the host country that may be high-skilled, h, or low-skilled, l 
IH
h,l, number of inactive native labour force in the host country that may be high-skilled, h, or low-
skilled, l 
 IF
h,l, number of inactive foreign labour force that may be high-skilled, h, or low-skilled, l 
=> LF
h,l+IF
h,l= NF, the total number of foreign immigrants in the host country 
 
 
E-W 
S-N 
Roxana Nedelescu                                                                     Free Movement of Persons: the Mirage of Social Security Schemes                
5 
 
Assuming: 
∂WH/ ∂IH,F
h,l <0, inactive citizens lower the host country welfare as most likely they will rely on the 
social security system of the host country; 
∂WH/ ∂LH,F
h > ∂WH/ ∂LH,F
l >0, therefore active citizens increases the welfare in the host country. The 
more skilled the labour force, the higher the welfare effects. 
 
High skilled migrant workers have high labour productivity and may be beneficial to the host country 
economy and native labour force by impeding firms to delocalize in search for human capital, while 
some low skilled migrant workers may occupy positions otherwise not supplied by the native labour 
force. Furthermore, recent  empirical evidence (Foged and Peri, 2015) shows that low skilled migrant 
workers may also positively impact host-country labour market by incentivising native low skilled 
workers to specialize and therefore obtain a higher wage rate.  
 
Once in the host country, the migrant  will have to choose between labour market participation 
(active) versus leisure (inactive) and in the former case, on the amount of labour supplied in the 
receiver country. Taking in consideration the wage level in the receiving country labour market and 
the amount of non-labour income such as social security or other welfare payments, foreign citizens 
will maximize their utility subject to an income budget constraint.  
 
Let high/low-skilled mobile citizens utility function be given by: 
UF
h,l=f(GF
h,l, VF
h,l), f’>0, f’’<0, where:                                                                                                                   
GF
h,l=consumption of goods  and services that may be acquired through income  
VF
h,l=leisure, which may be defined as activities conducted while not working 
If active, high/low-skilled workers income function YF
h,l=wF
h,l*xF
h,l+AF
h,l
 , where:                                     
YF
h,l=individual income 
wF
h,l=individual wage rate 
xF
h,l=individual labour supply 
AF
h,l=non-labour income such social assistance benefits  
 
Individuals are highly heterogeneous in terms of consumption versus leisure preferences which will 
induce different labour market outcomes. If inactive, 0 hours of working hours are supplied and 
individual income is AF
h,l if social assistance is received. With strong preference for leisure, individuals 
receiving social benefits will not participate in the labour market. 
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Figure 2. Labour Market Participation 
 
Based on Figure 2, if an individual receives no social assistance and has non-labour income, such as 
for example support from other members of family, with budget constraint line A, he or she will 
enter the labour market at point  x1
h,l and will decide to supply  xF
′h,l>0 amount of labour. If non-
labour income is received such as social benefits and assuming leisure is a normal good, this will shift 
the budget line to the right which allows the individual to have more utility in point  x2
h,l
. In this case, 
given that our mobile worker prefers leisure over consumption, indeed he or she will choose to 
supply 0 amounts of working hours, as the utility is higher in the second case.  
 
Therefore, the higher the non-labour income in the host country, the more likely the corner solution 
would be preferred in the case of a mobile worker that favours leisure and indeed, this evidence 
would support the “benefit tourism” hypothesis, i.e. mobile citizens free-riding on social security 
systems of the host country. In this case, a possible solution would be to condition the receipt of 
social assistance based on the period of prior participation in the labour market and social services 
that control and invite inactive workers to periodic job interviews or job placements.  
 
Since inactive citizens are heterogeneous, for those “trapped” in an unemployment spell, an 
alternative policy would be to incentivize them to increase their human capital by participating in 
vocational trainings and therefore be able to obtain an income in their field of activity or in a field 
that they re-specialize in. This is exemplified by budget line C. Individual utility is higher when he or 
she gains a wage which is higher with respect to the reservation income when receiving social 
assistance. As such, the optimal decision is to participate in the labour market at points  x3
h,l and 
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supply  xF
′′h> xF
′′l > 0 amount of labour. Overall:  xF
′′h> xF
′′l> xF
′h,l>0. As such, as human capital 
increases, labour market participation increases especially with higher wages. This may explain why 
inactive citizens classified as “benefit tourists” are lower skilled. 
 
With non-labour income, in Figure 3, let us assume that the individual budget line is A for low-skilled 
and A’ for high-skilled. As such, the worker will choose to supply the optimal amount of labour, 
  xF
′e:h> xF
′e:l>0  that maximizes utility. If non-labour income is introduced, the utility will increase but 
the labour supply will decrease   x′F
′e:h> xF
′′e:l>0. However if the wage rate increases, the optimal 
amount of labour will increase at points   x′′F
′e:h> xF
′′′e:l>0 since the wage rate of the high skilled is 
higher than that of the lower skilled. 
 
Figure 3. Optimal Labour Supply 
 
In Figure 3, the higher the skill, the higher the wage and the higher the willingness to increase the 
amount of labour supplied. Overall:  
                                                  x′′′F
e:h >  x′
F
e:h
>  x′′
F
e:h
>   x′′′F
e:l >  x′
F
e:l
>  x′′
F
e:l
> 0    
However, not always the effect of increasing the wage rate is that obvious. With non-labour income,  
the worker may consume more leisure and provide less labour supply, i.e. income effect. But as 
wages increase, the opportunity cost of leisure increases and as such, more time would be devoted 
to labour, i.e. substitution effect. Therefore the net effect is uncertain, depending on which of the 
two prevails.  
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Given that social welfare increases more with high skilled migrants, a discriminatory immigration 
policy that can perfectly distinguish between inactive/active and high skilled/low skilled would be 
most beneficial as the host country government would only incentivize high-skilled active workers to 
enter their economy. However, the government cannot observe the number of hours worked in 
order to identify the migrants which maximize welfare and regulate its labour market accordingly.  
 
But governments may incentivize either category through taxation.  Since the government can 
observe the gross income before taxation YF
h,l=wF
h,l*xF
h,l, if income is higher than consumption the 
government may impose a tax, otherwise, a subsidy. However, if the proportion of individuals 
receiving net subsidies increases tremendously due to increased low-skilled migration flows, the 
fiscal cost of redistribution could increases. Nevertheless, through taxation and redistribution, the 
government can maximize social welfare. 
 
III. Impact of Free Movement of Workers on Labour Markets 
Having discussed the drivers of migration as well as welfare effects of active/ inactive and high/low-
skilled migrant labour force, it is important to consider further the impact of migration flows on the  
labour market. Figure 4 describes the labour market functioning mechanism. In terms of demand for 
labour, marginal revenue productivity theory states that firms will hire an additional worker as long 
as the cost of that worker, i.e. his wage, is less than or equal to the value of that worker’s extra 
output, assuming that labour is homogeneous. 
 
Figure 4. Labour Productivity 
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Formally, let Q = f(K, L)  be the production function, where:                                                                
Q = output ; K = capital ; L = labour; P=price; W=wage 
With fixed capital, in the short run firms can only increase output by increasing labour. In discrete 
terms, the marginal product of labor can be denoted as: MPL = Q/L 
Total revenue (TR) is given by: TR= PxQ 
Marginal Revenue (MR) is given by MR=TR/Q 
Marginal revenue product: MRPL = MPLxMR=(∆Q/∆L)x(∆TR/∆Q) = ∆TR/∆L 
In order to maximize profits: 
MC= MR <=> W=MRPL , where MC=marginal cost 
Since MR=P => W=MPLxP or W/P = MPL  
As a rule, the firm should keep on hiring one more worker until the marginal cost of hiring this 
additional worker equals the marginal benefit. 
 
With integration, labour supply is directly affected through changes in the size of labour force due to 
migration, while labour demand is indirectly affected through changes in products markets. 
Assuming homogeneity of labour productivity and that immigrant and natives are perfect 
substitutes, with mobile labour force, wages across countries may be equalised as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Static Labour Market Integration: Direct Effect on Wages 
 
From a static perspective, in the host country (h), the equilibrium wage and labour supplied, 
Eh
1(Wh
∗, Lh
∗ ),  is given by the intersection of domestic supply, Sh, and demand, Dh.  The same 
reasoning applies in the foreign country (f), resulting in the equilibrium wage and labour supply,  
Ef
1(Wf
∗, Lf
∗).  
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Looking at the direct effect of labour mobility, if workers from the foreign country decide to enter 
the labour market of the host country, the labour supply increases in the host country. Assuming 
demand for labour is unchanged in the host country, the new equilibrium point is given by  
Eh
2(Wi
∗, Lhi
∗ ). As such, the outward shift of the labour supply curve lowers the equilibrium wage Wh
∗, 
to Dh , reducing the employment for residents from Lh
∗  to Lh  as they may not be willing to supply 
labour for a reduced wage, but total employment increases from Lh
∗  to Lhi in the host country. 
In the home country, the demand for labour supply increases as a result of workers leaving to go to 
the host country. Now the equilibrium is given by Ef
2(Wi, Lfi). In the home country, as a result of the 
export of labour, the domestic labour supply  decreases from Lf
∗ to Lf but the total labour supply as 
well as wage increases from Lf
∗  to Lfi , and respectively from Wf
∗ to Wi. 
 
There are also indirect effects through product markets. Figure 6 illustrates that contraction of 
domestic industry, due to imports, reduces domestic output and, consequently, demand for labour 
(1), while expansion of domestic industry, dues to exports increases output and as such, the demand 
for labour (2). 
Figure 6. Labour Market Integration: Indirect Effect on Wages 
 
Therefore, from a dynamic perspective, immigrant flows stimulate market change due to the output 
increase. The increase in labour supply induces a decrease in labour costs, i.e. wages. In the 
subsequent periods, the low labour cost can generate an increase of demand for products since 
more customers will be present in the market and following that, of labour. As shown in Figure 7, 
the decrease in the wage rate on the original demand curve Dh, on the longer-term, will induce an 
upward shift of labour demand, from Dh to D′h in the host country and from Df + Dh   to Df + D′h in 
the foreign country. With respect to both the equilibrium point without immigration and equilibrium 
Roxana Nedelescu                                                                     Free Movement of Persons: the Mirage of Social Security Schemes                
11 
 
point with integration, the total quantity of labour increases in both countries to L′hi, L′fi and the 
wage rate rises to W′i.   
 
Figure 7. Dynamic Labour Market Integration: Direct Effect on Wages 
 
Therefore from Figure 7 one may conclude that with increased labour force, both countries are 
better off in terms of higher employment and wages, provided that sufficient labour flows occur in 
the host country that  induces market change, i.e. an output increase and consecutively an increased 
demand for labour. 
 
IV. EU Rules on Free Movement of Persons  
So far, from a purely economic point of view, we have determined that labour movement is in fact 
beneficial for both the host and the foreign economies. Now we turn our attention to the legal 
framework and European legislation that governs the free movement of persons, in order to 
understand under which conditions EU citizens are entitled to move freely across borders. 
 
Free movement of persons and the right to reside in a different Member State, other than one’s 
own, is stipulated by the Art. 21(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (1992, formally the Treaty on European 
Union). These rights are not unconditional. Currently, Directive 2004/38/EC regulates the free 
movement of persons across the European Union. It defines the rights and obligations of European 
citizens, differentiating across residence rights, by duration of stay: for stays of less than three 
months, citizens have the right to reside in a different Member State only if they have a valid identity 
document or passport; for stays of more than three months, the right of residence is granted under 
certain conditions, i.e. sufficient economic resources as well as sickness insurance need to be 
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guaranteed such that the EU citizen and his family do not represent a burden for the host country 
social services and they may need to register with the local authorities; for stays of more than 5 
years, the right of permanent residence may be acquired, with equal rights to host Member State 
nationals. The right to enter and reside may be restricted only due to public policy, public security or 
public health grounds, but not due to economic arguments.   
 
In practice, EU law provisions concerning free movement of EU citizens have been implemented 
gradually. To start with, the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Schengen Implementing 
Convention (1990) abolished internal borders and  harmonized external border control procedures, 
among other achievements. However, not all1  EU Member States adhere to the convention as yet. 
The 2004/38 Directive has already been transposed into national law and implemented by all 
Member States. However, limitations concerning the free movement of persons have been 
maintained by several Member States concerning citizens of new Member States for a period of  
seven years following the date of accession. Therefore, restrictions on free movement of workers 
applied up to 1 January 2014 de facto in most2 EU Member States.  
 
From an economic point of view, labour market entry barriers were in place since employers would 
need to request work permits from the national authorities in order to hire a Romanian and 
Bulgarian citizens (EU2). With the lifting of entry barriers, the benefit tourism “hysteria” started. In 
the United Kingdom, politicians and certain sections of the media feared invasion: rules to access 
benefits were tightened in order to ensure that migrants could not claim out-of-work benefits for 
three months after their arrival and one would qualify for support only after six months of residence, 
assuming there existed a genuine chance of employment. Statistics confirmed part of the story: in 
2014 the number of Romanian and Bulgarian (EU2) immigrants in the UK increased with respect to 
the previous year, but the main reason for immigration was work-related: between April 2013 and 
June 2014, 167 282 EU2 citizens were employed in the UK. This number was significantly higher that 
the corresponding number of 126 082, for the previous period in 2013 (ONS). Still, the debate did 
not concern the increase in tax paying immigrants, but the increase of benefit tourists. Given that 
the latter are the main concern we wish to address, one may enquire what are the benefits that new 
immigrants can access under EU law.  
 
                                                            
1 Schengen members: EU Member States except Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus 
and Croatia plus Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein.  
2 Except Italy. In 2009, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Portugal and Denmark also lifted labour market restrictions for 
Romanians and Bulgarians. In 2011, Spain re-introduced labour market restrictions due to the economic and 
financial crisis. 
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V. EU Rules on Social Security Rights 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) sets out as an objective the establishment of a common 
market in order to support economic development and high employment rates, raising social 
protection as well as the standard of living in the Member States. Art. 3(1)(c) EEC clearly indicates 
that the Community aimed at “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for[…]persons”. It initially targeted economically active individuals and focused on 
creating a European labour market. But in order to support the development of the European labour 
market and incentivise intra-EU labour mobility, EU law ensures that national security systems do 
not act as a barrier and a disincentive for workers to move across Member States.  
 
As such, Regulation (EC) No. 883/20043 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2004)-Art. 4, 
Art. 70,  defines the coordination of social security systems between Member States concerning the 
application of social security schemes to employed, self-employed individuals as well as to members 
of their families, moving across EU Member States. To put it simply, in order to ensure access to 
benefits for workers when moving within Europe, the country where the work place is located has to 
provide insurance, or in the case of inactive individuals, the insurance is provided by the country of 
residence.  
 
Cash benefits may be transferred from one country to the other, and periods of insurance obtained 
in another EU country may be considered when applying for benefits. In fact, Art 7 of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 states that “cash benefits payable under the legislation of one or more Member States 
or under this Regulation shall not be subject to any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal 
or confiscation on account of the fact that the beneficiary or the members of his family reside in a 
Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for providing benefits is situated”. 
Country-specific conditions apply solely to country specific non-contributory cash benefits granted to 
individuals in certain need, but not based on contributions or means tested.  
 
Therefore, one could truly free-ride on national social systems by benefitting from non-contributory 
benefits. However, as we will see below, EU law allows Member States to restrict access to non-
contributory benefits. 
 
                                                            
3 Amended by Regulation (EC) No 988/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 (OJ 2009 L 284, p. 43), and Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 
77, and corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, OJ 2005 L 30, p. 27 and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34).   
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VI. The Dano Case  
The single market has been created by removing barriers to the movement of economically active 
citizens. Economic literature has generally found evidence that active workers are beneficial for both 
sending and receiving countries. Indeed we saw in previous sections that social welfare increases 
together with the increase in human capital and labour skills. But one cannot discriminate across 
labour market status and allow only active citizens to move freely across borders.  
 
We turn now to assess the implications of free movement of economically inactive citizens, 
especially since social benefit access by non-nationals has generated ardent debates at both national 
and EU level despite the fact that little evidence has been found to support the claim that EU citizens 
migrate to exploit benefits. Instead, the evidence points to the direction of moving for work or 
family reasons.  Regardless, social security/financial support are the prerogative of individual 
Member States. Social security rights4 do not depend on residence, but they may depend on the 
source of financing for the payment of these benefits (i.e. contributions made by employees and 
employers vs. non-contributory benefits) or on the minimum employment period5 (i.e. sickness cash 
benefits, maternity and paternity benefits, old-age benefits and unemployment benefits).  
 
In specific cases, such as in the case of Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig recently judged by the European 
Court of Justice, residence may be taken into account in order to assess the economic and social 
status of the person concerned. Furthermore, benefits that meet specific conditions as for example 
special non-contributory cash benefits that Ms. Dano requested, are not subject to Art. 7 of 
Regulation No. 883/2004. These benefits guarantee a minimum subsistence income and take into 
account the economic and social situation of the Member State concerned and in this case, are to be 
provided exclusively in the state of residence.  
 
Ms. Dano resided in Germany since July 2011 and received child benefit from the German 
authorities as well as maintenance payments.  She applied for “basic provision” aid (i.e. subsistence 
benefit, social allowance for her son, and support for accommodation and heating costs). Her 
application was denied. After she appealed in 2012, it was again refused by the Social Court, Leipzig. 
Evidence showed that Ms. Dano did not seek to integrate into the labour market, but only to benefit 
from the German social assistance scheme. Therefore, in order to avoid excessive social benefits 
                                                            
4 Benefits referred to are:  sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits;  invalidity benefits; 
old-age benefits;  survivors' benefits; benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases; death 
grants; unemployment benefits; pre-retirement benefits; family benefits. 
5 Requirements vary across Member States. 
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requests that would burden national assistance systems, unequal treatment concerning granting 
social assistance benefits between national of the host Member State and other EU citizens is 
permitted.  
 
However, in order to promote more integration and cross-border movement of persons, social 
exclusion is a crucial issue that needs still to be addressed. Art. 18 of The Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit any discrimination on the basis of nationality, while the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) Art. 1, 20, 51, state that human dignity 
must be respected and ban any type of discrimination. Given that EU nationals may reside for a 
period of more than three months in another Member State only if they have sufficient economic 
resources such that the EU citizen and his family does not represent a burden for the host country 
social services and in the absence of proven educational training and professional experience or 
effort to look for employment, ECJ ruled that EU law did not prevent the host Member State from 
denying non-contributory benefits to nationals of other Member States. As such, EU law protects the 
social security systems of individual Member States from being abused by non-nationals that do not 
seek to integrate in the labour market. 
 
VII. The Impact of Immigration: The Case of the United Kingdom 
As of 1st January 2014 labour market restrictions have been lifted for Romanian and Bulgarian 
citizens in countries where they were still enforced, among which, the United Kingdom. Policy 
makers should have rightfully been concerned about cheaper labour entering the British market 
from the EU2 countries, given the possibility that influx of foreigners would depress wages for native 
workers. British politicians and media grew instead very concerned with so-called benefit tourists, 
i.e.  EU2 citizens moving to the UK with the sole purpose of taking advantage of social assistance. In 
this context, several questions arise: does the British social security system allows for easy access to 
such benefits and if so, is this the main reason of EU2 citizens to migrate to the UK? Furthermore, 
given the increased migration to the UK, what is the balance between EU2 tax payers and EU2 
citizens requesting social assistance? In the following sub-sections we will answer these questions. 
The United Kingdom Social Security System: What the UK Is Allowed to Do6  
The British social security scheme comprises several services, as listed in Table 1 below. Social 
security financing is based on contributions7 made to the National Insurance Scheme, as well as 
general tax revenue.  
                                                            
6 Insurance is done automatically once 16 years old.  
7 See Annex Table 1 
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Table 1. The UK Social Security Scheme 
 
The UK system is a mix between Social Security paid on the basis of individual contributions and 
Social Assistance which is funded from general taxation. The main concerns when talking about 
benefit tourism relate in fact to the non-contributory cash benefits. Table 28 provides an extensive 
list of cash benefits and requirements to be met in order to be entitled to receive them.  
 
Table 2. UK Benefits Criteria 
 
Cash Benefits Requirements 
 
Sickness - Statutory Sick 
Pay  
Employment contract; 
Being sick for 4 days consecutively; 
Have average weekly earnings at least as equal to the lower earnings limit 
(LEL). 
Employment and Support 
Allowance 
 
Class 1 or 29 contributions which sums up to min. 26 times LEL paid in one of 
the last 2 tax years; 
Class 1 or 2 contributions of at least 50 times LEL paid or credited in each of 
the 2 past tax years. 
Statutory Maternity Pay  Minimum 26 consecutive weeks of work for the same employer; 
Average weekly earnings at least as equal to LEL. 
Maternity Allowance Not benefitting from Statutory Maternity Pay; 
Being employed for at least 26 weeks out of 66 test weeks; 
Average earnings at least as the maternity allowance threshold 
Ordinary Statutory 
Paternity Pay 
Worked for 26 weeks for the same employer; 
Average earnings in the last 8 weeks of at least the LEL 
Additional Statutory 
Paternity Pay 
Partner returned to work before the end of maternity/ adoption pay period. 
Worked for 26 weeks for the same employer; 
Average earnings in the last 8 weeks of at least the LEL 
Invalidity Benefits: 
Employment and Support 
Allowance 
Illness or disability sufferings certified by a medical assessment  
                                                            
8 See Annex Table 2 
9 See Annex Table 1 
National 
Insurance 
Scheme  (NIS) 
Comprises: cash 
benefits for 
sickness, 
unemployment, 
retirement, etc.   
Access:  
minimum 
amount of 
contributions 
paid 
National Health 
Service 
Comprises: 
free medical, 
dental, optical 
treatment 
Access: 
residence 
based 
Child Benefit 
and Child Tax 
Credit 
Comprises: 
cash 
benefits for 
raising 
children 
Access: 
having 
children 
Non-
Contributory 
Benefits 
Comprises: 
benefits for 
disabled 
persons or 
carers 
Access:  
residence 
based 
Other Statutory 
Payments 
Comprises: 
employers 
payments 
for child 
birth or 
adoption 
Access: 
having/ 
adopting 
children 
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Old Age Pension and 
Benefits 
Reach State Pensionable age 
Meet the minimum insurance contributions, for at least 30 tax years 
Survivor Benefits 
Bereavement Payment/ 
Allowance* 
Widowed Parent 
Allowance** 
Additional Pensions* 
Partner/Parent death 
*based on contributions 
**for individuals that are entitled to child benefit 
Work accidents Benefits 
Disablement benefit 
Disability due to a work accident or due to industrial disease 
Being disabled/ill for more than 15 weeks after the date of the accident 
Unemployment Benefit 
Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(182 days) 
Paid Class 1 contribution on earnings of at least 25 times LEL at least in one of 
the 2 relevant tax years; 
Paid Class 1 contribution on earnings of at least 50 times LEL at least in both  of 
the 2 relevant tax years. 
Income Support Part-time workers with income& capital are below a certain threshold 
Income Based Job Seeker 
Allowance 
Unemployed persons with income& capital are below a certain threshold, not 
entitled to any other benefit 
Council Tax Benefits Paid Council Tax and income& capital are below a given threshold 
Long Term Care 
Partial Assistance  
Co-financing  
Illness/disability on the long-term 
Family Benefits 
Child Benefit 
Child Tax Credit 
Being responsible for one or more children under 16 or up to 20 if in full-time 
education; 
Reside in the UK; 
State Pension Credit Be at least 65 years old 
Housing Benefit In case rent is paid and income and  capital are below a given threshold 
 
One may easily conclude that most benefits are accessed on condition of previous contributions. 
Therefore benefit tourism concerns: State pension credit, Income-based allowance for job seekers, 
Income support, Disability living allowance, Family/Child benefit and Housing benefit which are 
residence based.  
 
However, in order to access these benefits, one has to pass the Habitual Residence Test (HRT), and 
meet the residence requirements. Starting on 1 January 2014, the HRT consists of a decision based 
on the proof of right to reside based on nationality, immigration status, family circumstances and 
their right to reside under UK, EU laws and bilateral treaties and proof of habitual residency, i.e.  
period of residence in the UK, reason to migrate; how long one plans to stay, finding employment 
and proof of link to the UK. As such, before claiming benefits, the claimant needs to have been living 
in UK for three months.   
 
From 1 January 2014, several restrictions have already been implemented: 
 EEA nationals’ job seekers as well as EEA national workers which became unemployed, after 6 
months lose their rights to reside and indirectly the jobseeker allowance if evidence of actively 
seeking employment is not provided. 
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 Housing benefit is denied to new jobseekers as it does not fall under social security coordination 
rules. 
 In order to acquire the status of “worker” and implicitly access a wider range of out-of work and 
in-work benefits, new checks are in place:  
o Tier 1 assessment – a new Minimum Earnings Threshold is in place requiring minimum 
weekly earnings of £153, for three consecutive months;  
o In case Tier 1 threshold is not met, Tier 2 is applied – it consists of a detailed individual 
assessment, verifying if the individual’s activity is genuine and effective. 
Therefore one could easily conclude that, given the additional requirements the UK government 
introduced, as well as the discretion of Member States acknowledged by the ECJ ruling in the Dano 
case, the checks needed in order to prevent new immigrants from abusing the welfare system are 
already in place.  
 
The United Kingdom EU2 Migration Flows: What Is Actually Happening in the UK 
Regardless of checks and balances in place, one could argue that foreigners abuse the system, 
applying for benefits more often than natives, representing an extra burden. This section examines 
the relevant statistics. In 2013 the estimated Romanian citizens resident in the UK was 128 000, 
while resident population of Bulgarian citizens was 49 000; therefore for the EU2 countries, of 177 
000 (0.3%). Latest data available for the period April 2013 - June 2014 show that indeed there has 
been an increase in emigration to UK of EU2 citizens. Between June 2013 and June 2014, 32 000 
Romanian and Bulgarian citizens emigrated to the UK, a statistically significant increase from 18 000 
in the previous 12 months (IPS). Out of the 32 000, three quarters of EU2 citizens emigrated for work 
related reasons, i.e., 24 000. By mid-June 2014, approximately 209 000 EU2 citizens officially resided 
in the UK. In September 2014, 167 000 Romanian and Bulgarian citizens were registered as 
employed (LFS), which represents a 33% increase with respect to the same period in 2013. These 
statistics take into account the number of employed people present in the UK labour market at a 
certain time and do not take into account the immigration date. Regardless, EU2 immigration rate in 
the UK has increased over time, along with the employment rate. Overall, between July to 
September 2014, the employment rate of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens residing in the UK was 
about 79%, higher than non-EU citizens of 61.6%, and of the British citizens, of 73.6% (LFS).  
Certainly, the main reason to migrate is work related and not benefit-related.  
 
Table 3 presents available data concerning the number of individuals receiving UK social security 
benefits and tax credits, distinguishing between Romanian and Bulgarian claimants. 
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Table 3. Number of benefit claimants, by Country (House of Commons, 2014) 
Working age benefit claimants, February 2014 
 
Country Number  
Total 5 309 580 (100%) 
United Kingdom  4 914 160 (92.6%) 
EU 130 990 (2.5%) 
      Of whom 2 480 (0.05%), Romanians 
Less than 2 430, Bulgarians 
Other non-UK 264 430 (5%) 
Child Tax Credit (CTC) and/or Working Tax Credit (WTC), received starting with March 2014 
Total 4 644 200 (100%) 
United Kingdom  3 905 500 (84.1%) 
EU 317 800 (6.8%) 
Other non UK 421 100 (9.1%) 
Child Benefit, December 2013 
EEA countries or Switzerland 34 268 children 
     Of whom 392 children (1.14%) Romanian 
 245 children (0.7%) Bulgarian 
 
From the table above, it is obvious that Romanian and Bulgarian nationals have a very high rate of 
employment in the UK and a very low rate of social assistance claims. Weighing labour mobility costs 
and benefits, one may conclude that more tax revenue is received from EU2 residents in the UK, 
than benefits paid to them. The net fiscal impact of EU2 immigrants is positive for the UK. Overall, 
EU immigrants residing in the UK have made a net fiscal contribution of GBP 25 billion since 2001. 
For every 1 pound they receive in benefits, they pay 1.34 pounds.  Moreover, EU citizens are 45% 
less likely than UK natives to receive benefits.  
 
Certainly more data is needed to disentangle further across benefit requests per type and 
nationality. Nevertheless, one can clearly see that the overall effects of labour force migration is 
beneficial to the UK economy overall and EU2 migrants have a very high employment rate, not 
abusing the national social system. Furthermore, if the latter were true, going back to the Dano case, 
as the ECJ ruled, social assistance may be denied if specific conditions are not met and the claimant 
represents a burden for the host country social security system.  
 
Therefore Mr. Cameron’s proposed reforms concerning EU migrants access to welfare such as 
restricting EU migrants’ access to in-work benefits, restrictions on jobseekers’ rights to stay in UK 
after six months and a ban on child benefit claims for non-resident children, would have to be 
defensible. Otherwise, the ECJ could conclude that indirect discrimination would be in place for 
restricting child benefits (Open Europe, 2015), for example. Nevertheless, reforms would not require 
necessarily treaty changes, but rather EU or domestic legislation changes.  
Roxana Nedelescu                                                                     Free Movement of Persons: the Mirage of Social Security Schemes                
20 
 
VIII. Conclusion: Tackling European Migration 
As of 1st  January 2014, labour market and welfare systems restrictions imposed during the previous 
seven years on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens were lifted in the nine EU countries where they 
were still enforced. This liberalisation created uneasy public debates in the richer Member States, 
fearing massive immigration and free-riding behaviour on the national welfare systems, the so called 
“benefit tourism”. 
 
This paper has shown that while indeed there has been an increase in migration from Romania and 
Bulgaria towards the United Kingdom, the feared massive invasion has never materialised. 
Furthermore, the main reason for migration is work related. The employment rates of Romanian and 
Bulgarian workers are even higher than those of native labour force, while benefits claimed are 
enormously lower than those of native or non-EU migrants, corresponding to under 0.1% for 
working age benefits and under 2% for child benefit. These findings support previous research 
evidence by Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls (2010) showing that “migrants from EU 10 countries made 
a positive net contribution on average to public finances in the UK, i.e. that they paid more to the 
public sector in taxes than they received in the form of welfare grants and public spending.” 
Conducting a more in depth analysis, Dustmann and Frattini (2013) find that from 1995 to 2012, EEA 
immigrants “have made an overall positive fiscal contribution to the UK”, while “the net fiscal 
balance of non-EEA immigrants is negative, as it is for natives”. 
 
Furthermore, with EU social system coordination, the benefits under discussion have been shown to 
concern only non-contributory benefits, based on residence, which fall exclusively within the 
competence of national authorities. But since the UK has introduced already new rules on claiming 
benefits and the ECJ ruled that non-contributory benefits may be refused if certain economic and 
labour market requirements are not met, the “benefit tourism” debate may be closed.  
But with one issue closed, another arises. Since the host Member State may not expel other 
Member State citizens based solely on economic grounds, by refusing the right to access non-
contributory social benefits to a certain category of citizens, what the host Member State would in 
fact do is to create poverty. This is the real issue that has to be tackled in the future. Further 
coordination is needed covering non-contributory benefits in the form of either bilateral agreements 
between sending and receiving countries but even more importantly, a common EU approach is 
needed. A step further in the European integration process would be to progressively construct a 
true European labour market, with EU-wide social security agreements. Rather than transfer social 
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benefits rights, a central institution is needed to protect the rights of mobile workers as well as 
regulate and administer the requests for social assistance.  
Leaving aside the “benefit tourism” debate, the real discussion should be focused instead on the 
welfare effects of mobile workers in both the host and home country. In this paper it is shown that 
even if from a static perspective mobile workers may depress native salaries and employment levels, 
from a dynamic perspective both countries are better off with migration, wage and employment 
levels increasing. Furthermore, high-skilled mobile workers increase native welfare by being willing 
to supply more labour instead of leisure and by doing so, having a higher income and therefore 
contributing more to the host country budget. These findings corroborate the conclusions of 
extensive literature that there is little evidence of a negative effect of immigration on the host 
economy. On the contrary, with ageing labour force and decreasing wage differentials, little 
immigration has been found to reduce the native population welfare, while more immigration, to 
increase it.  
 
More research is needed in order to apprehend thoroughly the effects of immigration. In order to 
comprehensively understand trends in the labour market as well as welfare effects, national and 
European Union authorities should consider the development of relevant instruments and tools such 
as better time series data in order to quantify immigration effects that could contribute to the 
assessment and introduction of efficient policy proposals. Bottom-line, immigration is a sensitive 
topic: on the one hand, cultural differences may create fear, causing negative attitudes towards 
migrants that are over exploited by the media, while on the other, governments may use it as a 
strategic argument for their own benefit. 
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Annex 1 
Table 1. NIS Contributions 
Category Condition NIS Contribution Type10 
 
Employee Earnings Limit<Earnings<Primary threshold i. Pay to protect benefit rights 
Earnings>Primary threshold ii. Primary Class 1 (% deducted from 
weekly earnings) 
Earnings>Secondary threshold iii. Secondary Class 1 (paid by 
employers) 
Employer Employees benefits  iv. Class 1 A, 1 B 
Self-employed Earnings>Small Earnings Exception v. Class 2 (flat rate) 
Earnings>Income Tax Personal Allowance vi. Class 4 (not counted for benefits) 
Voluntary 
contributions 
Individuals not accountable for: i., v.,  
or contributions are not sufficient for benefits 
eligibility 
vii. Class 3 (count for retirement and 
bereavement, flat rate) 
 
 
                                                            
10 The exact rates for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 tax year are available here: https://www.gov.uk/national-
insurance/national-insurance-contributions-how-much-you-pay  
